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DLD-111        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3470 
 ___________ 
 
BROOKS TERRELL, Appellant 
 
v. 
 
LT. BENFER; LT. FLEMMINS;  
C.O. CHUCK ANDERSON 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 4-08-cv-01248) 
 District Judge:  Honorable James F. McClure 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 10, 2011 
 
 Before:  BARRY, FISHER and ROTH, Circuit 
 
Judges 
 (Opinion filed: May 24, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Brooks Terrell, a federal prisoner, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment.  Because the appeal presents no substantial question, 
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we will summarily affirm.  
I. 
Terrell filed a civil rights complaint on June 29, 2008.1
The defendants moved for summary judgment, citing a concession in Terrell’s 
complaint that he had failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
  He alleged that while he 
was confined at USP Lewisburg, the defendants—guards at that prison—had loudly 
proclaimed that he was a rapist and later moved him into a solitary confinement cell 
already occupied by another inmate.  Because that inmate believed him to be a rapist, he 
beat Terrell, tied him up, and held him hostage for several hours. 
2  Terrell responded, 
claiming that prior to filing the instant complaint he had filed two BP-8 Informal 
Resolution Attempts (“BP-8s”) regarding the conduct at issue.  Terrell attached two 
letters that he claimed reflected the dispositions of his BP-8s.  Plaintiff’s Mot. for Cross 
Summ. J., Dec. 16, 2008, ECF No. 21 at 3.  These letters were both dated June 3, 2008, 
informed him that his allegations had been forwarded to the S.I.S. Office3
                                              
1 Terrell’s complaint was docketed by the court on July 1, 2008.  However because 
Terrell is a prisoner and thus receives the benefit of the “prison mailbox rule” we use the 
date he signed his complaint, June 29, 2008.  See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 
(1988).   
 for review, and 
2 The defendants also noted a grievance Terrell had attempted to file directly to the 
Northeast Regional Office of the Bureau of Prisons as “sensitive”; however, they were 
unable to produce this grievance.  Terrell claimed that it was unrelated to the instant 
complaint, and instead pertained to a separate lawsuit, Terrell v. Passaniti, No. 4:08-cv-
1311, 2009 WL 3806254 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2009).  
3 Although Terrell did not provide the full name of this office, we note that this acronym 
refers to the “Special Investigative Supervisor.”  FLRA v. U.S. DOJ, 395 F.3d 845, 846 
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directed “any further questions or concerns about this BP-8 should be directed towards 
this Office.”  Terrell Aff. at 1, Nov. 17, 2008, ECF No. 21. 
 In its October 22, 2009 Memorandum and Order, the District Court concluded that 
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Bureau of Prisons’ formal 
grievance process was available to Terrell.  The District Court construed 28 C.F.R. 
§ 542.13(a) to require that prisoners await resolution of their informal attempts prior to 
filing a formal administrative grievance.  Because nothing in the record indicated that 
Terrell’s BP-8s had been resolved, the Court held that the formal grievance process may 
not have been available to Terrell in this instance.   
The defendants moved to reconsider, and the District Court reversed course.  
Because the letters Terrell received in response to his BP-8s did not state that he was 
prohibited from filing a formal grievance, the District Court held that the process was 
available to him and was never exhausted.  The Court accordingly concluded that there 
was no genuine issue of material fact as to exhaustion and granted the defendants’ motion 
for summary judgment.  Terrell timely appealed. 
II. 
   We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1291.  If no 
substantial question is presented by this appeal, we may summarily affirm the District 
Court’s order.  See
                                                                                                                                                  
(8th Cir. 2005).  The S.I.S. Office is responsible for investigations into potential 
disciplinary actions against Bureau of Prisons personnel.  Id. 
 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; IOP 10.6   We may affirm based on any ground 
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supported by the record.  Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).  
We exercise plenary review over the District Court=s order granting summary judgment.  
See DeHart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 262, 267 (3d Cir. 2004).4
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (the “PLRA”), a prisoner is required to 
pursue all avenues of relief available within the prison’s grievance system before 
bringing a federal civil rights action concerning prison conditions.  
   
See 42 U.S.C. ' 
1997e(a); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001).  A prisoner must exhaust even if 
the prison grievance system cannot provide the precise relief sought by the prisoner, such 
as money damages.  Booth, 532 U.S. at 741. The “exhaustion requirement applies to all 
inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular 
episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.”  Porter v. 
Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).  The purpose of the PLRA is to eliminate unwarranted 
federal-court interference with the administration of prisons, and it “thus seeks to afford 
corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before 
allowing the initiation of a federal case.”  Woodford v. Ngo
                                              
4 Summary judgment is proper where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in favor of that party, there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2) (We cite to Rule 56 as it appeared before its December 1, 2010 
amendment.  The amendment has no effect on this appeal);4 Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 
197, 210 (3d Cir. 2010).  We review the District Court’s grant of a motion to reconsider 
for abuse of discretion.  Caver v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 257-58 (3d Cir. 2005). 
, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006) 
(internal quotation omitted). 
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The Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has established an administrative remedy 
procedure through which an inmate can seek formal review of any complaint regarding 
any aspect of his imprisonment.  See 28 C.F.R. '' 542.10-542.19.  In order to exhaust an 
appeal under the administrative remedy process, an inmate must first present his 
complaints to prison staff informally.  See 28 C.F.R. ' 542.13.  Although the policies 
governing the S.I.S. Office to which Terrell’s complaint had been forwarded are not 
public, see FLRA v. U.S. DOJ
Terrell’s argument that he should be excused from the exhaustion requirement is 
unpersuasive.  Even assuming arguendo that the responses to Terrell’s BP-8s misled him 
into believing that the formal administrative processes was unavailable, his claims were 
still unexhausted.  The letters Terrell received clearly indicate that his claims had been 
transferred to another office for review—rather than reflecting the disposition of his 
claims, the letters demonstrated that his claims were pending.  At the time Terrell filed 
his federal complaint, only four weeks had passed since his complaint’s referral for 
investigation of staff misconduct—well short of a reasonable period for the S.I.S. Office 
to conduct a robust investigation of such serious allegations.  Accordingly, his filing of a 
civil rights complaint in federal court was premature.  42 U.S.C. ' 1997e(a). 
, 395 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that the S.I.S. 
manual is “limited use, highly sensitive”), the BOP program statement governing internal 
investigations generally contemplates lengthy investigations of staff misconduct.  Federal 
Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement No. 1210.24 at (9)(e) (May 20, 2003) (mandating 
investigation status updates every 60 days for investigations lasting longer than 60 days).  
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Terrell fares no better even if he reasonably thought that inactivity by the S.I.S. 
Office was tantamount to denial of his BP-8.  See 28 C.F.R. § 542.18 (“if the inmate does 
not receive a response within the time allotted for reply, including extension, the inmate 
may consider the absence of a response to be a denial at that level.”). If his informal 
grievance had been denied, Terrell would have been obligated to turn to the formal 
grievance process available to federal prisoners.  Completion of that entire process, prior 
to filing in federal court, is necessary for exhaustion. 5
Accordingly, regardless of whether he believed that an S.I.S. Office investigation 
was ongoing or had been completed in silence, Terrell failed to exhaust the administrative 
processes made available by the BOP.  We therefore agree with the District Court’s view 
on reconsideration that summary judgment was appropriate because there was no genuine 
issue of material fact as to Terrell’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies.  The 
District Court did not abuse its discretion by granting the defendants’ motion to 
reconsider to correct its earlier judgment.  
 
See Max's Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. 
v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999).  There being no substantial question 
presented by Terrell’s appeal, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.  See
 
 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; IOP 10.6. 
 
                                              
5 We note also that any delays that may be caused by an informal investigation present no 
barrier to timely pursuing a formal administrative grievance.  Under 28 C.F.R. 
§ 542.14(b), the deadline for the filing of an administrative remedy request may be 
extended in case of an unusually long period taken for informal resolution attempts. 
